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We investigate the role of financial analysts as corporate watchdogs. We show that firms that are 
subject to intense analyst monitoring are more likely to be investigated by the SEC or to be the 
subject of a securities class action. Using cross-sectional variations in managerial entrenchment 
we find that this effect is not a reflection of the “dark side of analyst coverage”, analysts pushing 
executives to misbehave to exceed short-term expectations. Our findings are robust to different 
identification strategies addressing the endogeneity of analyst coverage decisions. 
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Financial analysts are in the business of producing valuable firm-specific information that they 
then sell to interested investors (either directly or bundled with brokerage services). In the last 
ten years a growing body of literature has analyzed how this activity affects managerial behavior. 
Some authors have showed that the increased information availability improves firms’ access 
to financial markets which allows firms to invest more (Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012; Derrien and 
Kecskés, 2013), while others have pointed out that it may also force company executives to focus 
on meeting short term earnings expectations and forgo valuable long term investment projects 
(Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; He and Tian, 2013; Irani and Oesch, 2016). 
Accounting information produced by the company is often the base for an analyst’s internal 
evaluation of firm prospects. In the process of producing earnings expectations and target prices 
analysts implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) judge the quality of the company financial 
statements. They may, for example, point out that current earnings appear inflated through 
accounting practices that, although maybe legal, do not reflect the company’s true profitability. 
Numerous studies (Yu, 2008; Irani and Oesch, 2013; Chen, Harford, and Lin, 2015) show that the 
number of analysts covering a firm is inversely correlated with the size of abnormal accruals, 
widely used in the accounting literature as a proxy for “creative” accounting. 
In this paper we investigate the channel through which financial analysts are able to affect the 
quality of financial statements. Specifically, we investigate whether analyst coverage affects the 
probability of corporate litigation. The basic idea is that an un-ethical corporate executive would 
decide to misbehave (manipulate earnings) if the expected benefit exceeds the expected cost. This 
last quantity can be seen as the product of the probability of being caught times the damage in case 
the misbehavior is discovered (criminal charges, reputational loss, legal fees, fines, etc.). Here we 
posit that financial analysts, as information providers, increase the probability that managerial 
misbehavior will be ultimately discovered. As a result of this increased litigation risk, other 
factors being equal, corporate executives will choose to produce higher quality accounting 
4  
information. 
We fully acknowledge that financial analysts are not the only actors constraining managerial 
behavior through information production and dissemination. Various contributions in the literature 
have analyzed the competing roles of different information providers. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), 
for example, explicitly model the competing information production role of financial analysts, 
institutional investors and corporate insiders (through the mandatory disclosure of their trading 
activity). In this paper we focus on the role of financial analysts while controlling for the level of 
institutional ownership in any given company. All our results should thus be interpreted as the 
“additional effect” of analyst coverage. We also show that information production by financial 
analysts is a substitute for the action of institutional investors by showing that the effect of analyst 
coverage is weaker in companies with large institutional ownership. 
In our empirical analysis we consider two different types of litigation events: Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued by the SEC during or at the conclusion of an 
investigation against a company or an officer for alleged accounting misconduct, and securities 
class actions filed by investors who suffered economic injury as a result of violations of the securities 
laws. We show that after controlling for firm characteristics that affect the demand for brokerage 
(and analysts) services as well as for observable measures of managerial misbehavior, an increase of 
coverage of one standard deviation increases the probability of being involved in a litigation event 
by 30% - 53%.1 
We fully acknowledge that a second, and more sinister, explanation can be given for our 
empirical evidence. Authors have recently pointed to a possible “dark side” of analyst coverage: 
by increasing the visibility of firm (short-term) performance analysts may create excessive pressure 
for the company executives to meet short term earnings goals. For example company executives may 
underinvest in R&D (He and Tian, 2013) or manipulate earnings through, for example, artificially 
anticipating the timing of sales (Irani and Oesch, 2016). Here we acknowledge the possibility 
                                                        
1 From 1.1% to 1.43% for Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and from 1.82% to 2.79% for securities 
class actions. 
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that the increase of litigation risk associated with an increase in coverage, may not be a function 
of better monitoring but of an increase pressure on the executives to misbehave.  
In order to distinguish between these two alternative hypothesis (discipline vs pressure) we use 
time-series and cross-sectional variations in managerial entrenchment. A highly entrenched 
manager will not feel an excessive pressure to meet short term goals because he/she cannot be 
punished for underperforming. Therefore our pressure hypothesis predicts that when managerial 
entrenchment is high, higher coverage should not lead to more misbehavior (and thus litigation risk). 
Conversely in firms with highly entrenched managers is exactly when the external discipline role 
of analysts becomes very valuable because mechanisms of internal governance often fails to 
properly control entrenched managers (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; 
Arena and Ferris, 2007) and (small) shareholders in these firms would rely on external sources of 
information in order to protect themselves either by “voting with their feet” or through legal means. 
Our discipline hypothesis thus makes an opposing prediction that in firms with entrenched 
managers the relationship between coverage and litigation risk should be particularly strong. 
By using different proxies of managerial entrenchment based on the Governance Index of 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and on the presence of large institutional investors we show a 
uniform support for the discipline hypothesis. Hence, at least in this case, we find no trace of the 
“dark side” to analyst coverage. That is, the increase in litigation risk associated with an increase 
in the number of analysts following a firm reflects the disciplining role of analysts. This in turn 
offers a clearer picture of the channel through which financial analysts are able to affect the 
behavior of company executives, at least in terms of the quality of the financial/accounting 
information provided to the public. 
Research on financial analysts has long been aware of the endogeneity of analysts’ coverage 
decisions. Unobserved factors that drive an analyst’s decision to cover a specific firm may also drive 
the SEC to investigate the same firm (or a tort lawyer to initiate a class action). We address this 
endogeneity issue with a quasi-natural experiment analyzing the change in litigation risk around the 
exogenous drop in coverage due to the merger of two brokerage houses (as in Hong and Kacperczyk, 
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2010) or the closure of a brokerage establishment (as in Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012). Our main 
result is robust to this specification, both in significance and in magnitude. 
Our results contribute first and foremost to the literature on the role analysts in corporate 
governance. Prior studies find that firms covered by more analysts engage in less earnings 
management (Yu, 2008; Irani and Oesch, 2013; Chen, Harford, and Lin, 2015), and the authors 
attribute their results to the monitoring role of analysts first proposed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). In this paper, we present evidence that it is the monitoring role of analysts, the ability of 
analysts to discover and reveal managerial misbehavior, which forces corporate executives to 
produce higher quality accounting information. Our paper is closest in spirit to Dyck, Morse, and 
Zingales (2010) as they find that analysts revealed 14% of the 216 class action lawsuits from 
1996 to 2004. While this paper presents very compelling evidence about the role of financial 
analysts in discovering corporate frauds, its scope is, in a sense, quite limited. Financial analysts 
are effective corporate watchdogs not only when they unearth unhealthy managerial practices, 
but also when they enable other actors to do the same. By providing an external assessment of 
corporate accounts they may enable other actors to discover weaknesses or inconsistencies. The 
analyst may not be the one to blow the whistle but may have still played a key role in the process. 
Here we extend the analysis of Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010) by examining how the 
information production role of analysts can enable both themselves and other parties to better 
detect managerial misbehavior. More importantly, our empirical design allows us to identify 
whether the frauds revealed are caused by the bright side (discipline) or the dark side (pressure) 
of analyst activity.  
Our study is also related to the literature on the relationship between internal and external 
governance mechanisms. Existing evidence is unclear as to whether internal governance mechanisms 
(provided by the board and institutional investors) and external governance mechanisms 
(provided by the managerial labor market and the market for corporate control) act as 
complements or substitutes (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Cremers 
and Nair, 2005; Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks, 2011). We contribute to this literature by showing 
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that the external discipline role of analysts is extremely valuable in firms with entrenched 
managers as it is very difficult for internal governance mechanisms to restrain their behavior in these 
firms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3 
introduces our dataset. Section 4 analyzes the link between coverage and litigation risk. Section 
6 address the issue of endogeneity of analyst coverage decisions. Section 7 distinguishes between 
disciplining and pressure hypotheses. Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
 
2.1. Financial analysts and managerial discipline 
 
As accounting and finance professionals, financial analysts interact directly with the top 
management on a consistent basis before disseminating information to the general public. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) posit that the unique information intermediary role of analysts should help 
them to monitor corporate executives and reduce the agency costs associated with the separation 
of ownership and control. Empirical findings in the past decade validate this proposition. Yu (2008) 
finds that firms covered by less analysts engage in more earnings management, while Irani and 
Oesch (2013) and Chen, Harford, and Lin (2015) using an experimental design, find that after a 
firm experiences an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage its managers are more likely to 
engage in earnings management activities. 
Analysts are in a unique position to detect managerial misbehavior due to their analytical 
skills and their access to the top management. Moreover they also possess the right incentives as they 
are ethically restricted from having any financial interest in the firms they cover and they can benefit 
from the notoriety resulting from uncovering some high profile scandal. As a result of this unique 
combination of skills, access and incentives the presence of financial analysts would increase the 
probability that misbehavior will be detected. This view is consistent with Kedia and Philippon 
(2009) who predict that managers would have a greater incentive to rent-seek when facing a lower 
8  
probability of detection by external monitors. 
One could argue that, in equilibrium, this increased monitoring should lead to lower levels of 
misbehavior and hence lower litigation risk. However, in our models we control for visible signs 
of managerial misbehavior and hence estimates, to the extent we can, a conditional probability of 
litigation. While it may be true that increased monitoring reduces instances of managerial 
misbehavior (Yu, 2008; Kedia and Philippon, 2009), executives who still decide to pursue legally 
questionable endeavors are more likely to be fired. On the surface, empirical evidence by Dyck, 
Morse, and Zingales (2010) showing that analysts revealed 14% of the class action lawsuits from 
1996 to 2004 seems to suggest analysts help to discipline managers. 
 
2.2. Financial analysts and managerial pressure 
 
Prior literature suggests that there is also a “dark side” to financial analysts: the excessive 
pressure they impose on corporate managers to meet short term earnings expectations. Studies have 
shown that beating forecasts increases short-term returns (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002; 
Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis, 2009) while missing forecasts can lead to a reduction in 
bonuses for the CEO (Matsunaga and Park, 2001) and a decrease in stock prices for the firm 
(Skinner and Sloan, 2002). As a result, a majority of executives would invest less in innovation 
and advertising expense in order to meet the short term earnings benchmarks (Graham, Harvey, 
and Rajgopal, 2005; He and Tian, 2013). A recent study by Irani and Oesch (2016) shows that 
managers in firms covered by more analysts also try to conceal true firm performance by engaging 
in  real earnings management performed predominantly via the offering of price discounts to 
temporarily increase sales, overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold, and reduction of 
discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins. Overall, the findings of these studies 
collectively suggest that analyst coverage also provides a strong incentive for corporate managers 
to misbehave in order to meet short term earnings expectations. The dark side of analyst coverage 
could also explain our main empirical finding: firms covered by more analysts are more likely to 
be involved in litigation not because of the more intense monitoring, but because the additional 
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pressure to meet short-term expectations provides additional incentives for top management to 
misbehave. 
Since both the discipline and the pressure hypotheses imply a positive effect of analyst 
coverage on litigation risk, we cannot easily distinguish between the two. In order to identify the 
mechanism behind this empirical evidence, we use time-series and cross-sectional variations in 
managerial entrenchment. A critical feature of this identification strategy is that the discipline and 
pressure hypotheses lead to two opposite empirical predictions when we condition on the 
entrenchment level of the management. The idea is that under the pressure hypothesis we should 
observe a weaker effect of coverage on litigation risk for highly entrenched managers as these 
managers would feel less pressure to meet or beat analyst expectations because they cannot be easily 
punished in case of underperformance. Conversely in firms with highly entrenched managers is 
exactly when the discipline role of analysts becomes very valuable because mechanisms of internal 
governance often fails to control powerful managers (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Ryan and 
Wiggins, 2004) and in these firms the (small) shareholders will more heavily rely on external 
sources information to protect their investment. Our discipline hypothesis thus makes an opposite 
prediction in that for firms with entrenched managers the relationship between coverage and litigation 




We use data from the COMPUSTAT-CRSP merged database on public companies listed in the 
three major US stock markets from 1988 to 2016. We restrict our sample to firm-year observations 
where the initial value of total assets is not smaller than $100 million and the initial stock price is 
above (or equal to) $1. To account for the effect of institutional investors, which is positively 
correlated with analyst coverage (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990) and could also affect litigation risk 
due to their monitoring role, we extract institutional ownership information from Thomson 
Reuters 13(f) filings and control for institutional ownership in all of the tests. After matching the 
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firms with the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database which provides data on 
financial analysts and dropping observations with missing values for the accounting variables of 
interest, we obtain a sample of 60,577 firm/year observations with 7,055 unique firms. In the 
second part of the paper we also consider governance data. As a proxy for governance quality 
we use the G-Index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) provided by Institutional Shareholder 
Services (formerly RiskMetrics). 
 
3.1. Securities class action lawsuits 
 
We obtain data on filings of securities class action lawsuits from the Stanford Law School 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse.2 These data begin in 1996 and continue through current 
time. Common classes of examples include omitting material information; artificially inflated 
earnings, revenue, sales and assets; and premature revenue recognition. After applying our sample 
selection criteria, we carefully match the lawsuit firms by ticker symbol, company name and date 
with the Compustat and I/B/E/S database. This matching process leaves us with a final sample 
consisting of 994 lawsuit events from 809 unique firms. 
Using securities class action lawsuits to identify fraud offers certain advantages over other 
approaches. As Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008) mention, identifying fraud using press releases 
or private lawsuits can miss many instances of fraud and that many targeted companies get delisted 
before regulators formally file charges. Class action lawsuits, on the other hand, tend to be filed 
quickly after the disclosure of violations, on average one day after the trigger event 
announcement. However, a potential drawback of using class action lawsuits to identify fraud is 
that the investigation phase in lawsuits follows the filing of the lawsuit, whereas for federal 
enforcement actions such as AAERs, the investigation phase precedes enforcement. Therefore, 
our lawsuit sample may include firms with alleged fraud that may eventually be dismissed. In 
order to solve this problem, we also use AAERs as a proxy for fraud. 
 
                                                        
2 http://securities.stanford.edu. 
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3.2. Accounting and Auditing  Enforcement Releases 
 
Since 1982, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued AAERs during or at 
the conclusion of an investigation against a company, an auditor, or an officer for alleged 
accounting and/or auditing misconduct. Most AAERs relate to revenue recognition, misstatement 
of expense/shareholder equity account, capitalization of costs as assets, and misstatement of 
accounts receivable. We obtain the dataset from Hass School of Business, University of California 
Berkeley. After matching firms with AAERs by Central Index Key (CIK) and date with the 
Compustat and IBES database, our final sample includes 588 AAER filings from 375 different 
firms. As mentioned before, the investigation phase precedes the issuance of AAERs.  The SEC 
has a limited budget, so it only selects firms where there    is strong evidence of manipulation. 
For example, some of the firms are those that restate earnings or have large write-offs such as 
Enron or Xerox, or other firms that have already been identified by the press as having misstated 
earnings (see Miller, 2006). Therefore, the advantage of the AAER sample is that we can be certain 
the SEC has identified manipulating firms (the Type I error rate is low). 
In our analysis we consider securities class action lawsuit and AAERs separately. As a 
robustness we also construct a synthetic Litigation Event variable that combines the two events. 
This yields a sample of 1,545 incidents from 613 distinct firms. The number of fraud firms varies 
by year and industry. For example, there were 125 fraud firms in 2002, but only 48 in 1997. In terms 
of industry, most fraud firms are in the technology (27.70%), followed by healthcare (13.92%). 
The rate of litigation also varies through time for a given sector. For example, the share of 
litigation attributable to firms in the technology sector was high between 1999 and 2000 (32.44%) 
during the Dot-com bubble, while financial firms had a large share of litigation in 2008 (34.78%) 
during the financial crisis. 
Most of this industry/time variation can be explained by changes in market valuations. 
Accounting manipulation and other forms of improper behavior are usually aimed at propping 
up the market value of a stock and this leads to the evidence in Table II where we see that firms 
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involved in fraud events have higher Tobin’s Q than the general sample (especially when paired 
with lower return on assets). We also see that firms involved in litigation events tend to be larger. 
This makes sense as the size of a firm serves as a proxy for the possible gains from a security 
class action, and with respect to AAERs the SEC is also more likely to direct its limited resources 
in investigating larger firms. As expected we also see that litigation firms have a lower ratio of 
fixed to total assets (indicating a greater facility for creative accounting) and a higher level of 
abnormal accruals. 
Finally we see that firms involved in litigation events are, on average, covered by more than 
12 analysts versus an average coverage of 8.5 for the firms that have not been involved in litigation 
events. While this univariate evidence is per se suggestive, we need to be careful in the 
interpretation as we know from prior literature (see for example Bhushan, 1989 and McNichols 
and O’Brien, 1997) that analysts have incentives to cover larger firms and firms with a strong 
economic performance. Further analysis will be needed to properly assess the causal relationship. 
 
[Place Table I about here] 
 
 
[Place Table II about here] 
 
 
4. Litigation Risk and coverage 
 
Numerous studies (Yu, 2008; Irani and Oesch, 2013; Chen, Harford, and Lin, 2015) show 
that the number of analysts covering a firm has a positive effect on accounting quality (as measured 
by earnings manipulation via abnormal accruals). Here we argue that this effect is channeled via an 
increase in the probability of being caught as analysts are likely to shed light on inconsistencies 
and unusual or suspect accounting practices when they perform in-depth analysis of firms’ 
accounting information. Moreover the information that they provide to the public may also enable 
other actors to unveil fraudulent behavior. 
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As a first step in the analysis of this hypothesis we estimate a probit model where the 
probability of being involved in a litigation event is a function of analyst coverage and a series 
of firm-specific control variables. 
 
Pr(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) = Φ(α+ β𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘)                 (1) 
 
Fit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has been involved in a litigation event during 
year t and Φ is the Cumulative Distribution Function of the standard normal distribution. 
The main variable of interest is the (natural logarithm of the) number of analysts covering the firm 
at the beginning of the period (Coverageit). The logarithmic transformation is standard in the 
analysts literature and reflects the assumption that the quantity of original information available 
does not grow linearly with the number of analysts covering a firm. 
Controlsit is a vector of firm-specific characteristics that are likely to affect the demand for 
analysts services and may also have an unspecified effect on the outcome variable. The specific 
consideration of these quantities allows us to conduct a cleaner estimation of the residual effect 
of analyst coverage on the litigation risk. 
In this model, we consider the size of the firm (natural logarithm of total assets), growth 
opportunities (Tobin’s Q), profitability (ROA), leverage, percentage of fixed assets, cash flow 
volatility, reliance on external financing and institutional ownership. The formulation of each 
variable is detailed in Table I. 
Litigation risk is also clearly a function of managerial behavior. Firms that implement shoddy 
accounting practices or engage in blatant earnings manipulation are more likely to be audited or 
sued regardless of the action of financial analysts. Therefore in an alternative specification of our 
model we also control for a number of proxies for accounting and real earnings manipulation 
derived from publicly available information. 
As a proxy for accounting quality we first consider the same measure of abnormal accruals 
implemented by Yu (2008) based on a modified version of the Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow, 
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Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995), which estimates discretionary accruals from cross-sectional regressions 
of total accruals on changes in sales and on property, plant, and equipment (PPE) within industries 
(The details of the calculations are described in Appendix). 
In addition to accounting earnings management, Irani and Oesch (2016) show that a closer 
scrutiny by financial analysts may induce managers to substitute accounting earnings management 
with real earnings manipulation. While our first type of litigation (AAERs) is focused on 
accounting irregularities, shareholders litigation may also be triggered by a wider range of 
managerial misbehavior and thus is important to also control for these factors. 
Irani and Oesch (2016) consider three forms of real activity manipulation: 
 
• Sales manipulation achieved by acceleration of the timing of sales via more favorable credit 
terms or steeper price discounts. 
• Reduction of discretionary expenditures, which include SG&A expenses, advertising, and 
R&D. 
• Reporting a lower cost of goods sold (COGS) by increasing production. 
We follow their work and consider abnormal levels of cash flow from operations, discretionary 
expenses, and production costs as additional variables in the alternative specification of our model 
(the details of the calculations are provided in Appendix). Finally, our models also include year and 
industry fixed effects (built on SIC 2-digit codes), and all standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. 
We start with a parsimonious model that regresses AAERs on our key variable of interest, 
Coverageit and a set of control variables that proxies for the demand of brokerage services. Results 
in model (1) of Table III show that there is a positive and significant relationship between analyst 
coverage and the probability of receiving AAERs. In column (2), we add another set of control 
variables that proxies for managerial misbehavior. The coefficient estimate of analyst coverage 
continues to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level with no significant change in 
magnitude. Similarly, we analyze the relationship between the probability of being involved in 
securities class actions and analyst coverage in columns (3) and (4), and we obtain similar results. 
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To sum up, we combine the two types of litigation events and regress it on analyst coverage in 
columns (5) and (6). The coefficient estimate of analyst coverage continues to be positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
It is important to remember that analysts are not the only actors capable of developing and 
disseminating firm-specific information. Following the intuition of Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2004), we specifically include in the model the level of institutional ownership to account for the 
information discovery role of institutional investors. The estimated coefficient for our coverage 
variable captures the additional informational effect of financial analysts. 
To assess how material the effect of changes in coverage on changes of litigation risk is, in 
Figure 1 we plot the expected probability of being involved in litigation events from models (2) 
and (4) in Table III for levels of coverage ranging from the 5th to the 95th percentile. For ease of 
interpretation we re-state the graphs of the marginal effects in terms of non-logarithmic coverage. 
The graph shows that the effect of analyst coverage is both economically and statistically 
significant. For example we know that the unconditional probability of being subject of an 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release is 1.09%. The estimated probabilities range from 
0.67% for firms covered by a single analyst to 1.68% for firms in the 95th percentile of coverage. The 
results indicate that a one standard deviation increase of coverage from the mean increases the 
litigation risk from 1.1% to 1.43% (a 30% increase). For securities class actions the effect is even 
stronger, with a range of litigation risk from 0.76% to 3.43% in the 5th and the 95th percentile 
(compared to an unconditional risk of 2.05%). In this case a one standard deviation increase of 
coverage from the mean generates an increase in litigation risk from 1.82% to 2.79% (a 53% 
increase). 
 
[Place Table III about here] 
 
 




5. Analyst  Incentives 
 
An interesting and often overlooked aspect of the literature on financial analysts is the analysis 
of their incentive structure. Arguably producing accurate information requires both skill and effort, 
and this is particularly true in the case of discovery of managerial misbehavior. Analysts with 
stronger incentives should produce higher quality information and have stronger effect on 
litigation risk. 
Incentives can be analyzed at two different levels: personal and institutional. For individual 
analysts, different contributions in the literature show that analysts are rewarded for generating 
useful firm-specific information. For example Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2015) surveyed 
365 analysts on the most relevant determinants of their compensation. According to the respondents 
the number one factor is clients and brokers satisfaction votes. It is easy to imagine how highlighting 
possible accounting irregularities in covered companies may benefit clients and increase analyst 
appreciation. On a more systematic level Hong and Kubik (2003) show that analysts with higher 
accuracy are compensated with positive career outcomes. 
Financial analysts are employed by brokers and, like any other employee, will focus their efforts 
according to the indications of their employer. It is well known in the literature that investment 
banks may use analyst coverage as a tool to cross-sell other services, and there is evidence that 
historically brokers have skewed their coverage toward the positive side (see, for example, Barber, 
Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman, 2006). 
To analyze institutional incentives, here we identify a group of brokers who actually have a 
strong incentive to identify managerial misbehavior: brokers affiliated with institutional investors 
who have a stake in the covered company (hence “affiliated brokers”). Since in our sample we 
cannot observe buy-side analysts, we consider brokers affiliated with an institutional investor who 
owns stocks in the covered company as the best possible proxy. An analyst working for such an 
institution will likely experience a positive career outcome for highlighting managerial misbehavior 
that could harm investors. 
17  
Empirically we take the 25 largest brokers in I/B/E/S in terms of number of firms covered in our 
sample period. We then match these institutions to institutional investors in the Thomson Reuters 
13f filings.  We label “Affiliated” as a broker that is covering a firm in   a certain year while 
having, at the same time, a positive equity ownership in the same company. Overall, we are able 
to match 24 out of the 25 institutions, with the remaining one being a pure research outfit without 
any visible affiliation with an institutional investor. These institutional investors hold positions in 
46.79% of our firm/years observations, with an average stake of 1.4% (and a median stake of 
0.6%). We can then divide our coverage variable into an “Affiliated and an “Unaffiliated 
component and test whether both types of coverage have the same effect on litigation risk. 
Our assumption is that affiliated brokers have stronger incentive to perform as corporate 
watchdogs and so affiliated coverage should have stronger marginal effect on litigation risk. 
We acknowledge that our measure of affiliated coverage is not perfect, as it is based only on the 
25 largest outfits in I/B/E/S. The main constraint is that we can only match institutions between 
I/B/E/S and the 13f filings by name. Outside of the top players this match becomes quite uncertain, 
especially because I/B/E/S only provides a truncated version of the name. Fortunately, the top 25 
players represent 44.6% of the total supply of coverage during our sample period (in terms of 
number of firms covered). For the companies in our sample covered by these institutions, the 
average affiliated coverage is 2.38 analysts (median = 2) and this represent, on average, 26.6% of 
the total coverage they receive (median = 20%). So while we acknowledge that our measure of 
affiliated coverage likely underestimates the real value, we can also conclude that it has economic 
significance in terms of coverage. 
The results in our analysis are reported in Table IV and confirm the intuition that institutional 
incentives play a role as the marginal effect of affiliated coverage is clearly stronger than that of 
unaffiliated analysts. One could argue that this effect may capture a firm selection effect: 
institutional investors may refuse to invest in opaque firms. The reduced institutional ownership 
would translate, given our methodology, in a lack of affiliated coverage for firms for which analysts 
in general may be unable to develop useful information. To minimize this confounding factor we 
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repeat the analysis on the subset of firms with affiliated coverage (models 4 - 6). The effect on this 
sub-sample is even stronger. Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of the two types of coverage on 
estimated litigation risk. 
 
[Place Table IV about here] 
 
 





While our baseline results are consistent with our hypothesis that financial analysts act as 
corporate watchdogs, an important concern is that coverage decisions are not random. 
Unobservable firm heterogeneity correlated with both analyst coverage and the probability of 
litigation could bias our results.  Specifically, we know that the SEC has to make active decisions 
about the allocation of its scarce investigative resources, and that tort lawyers decide which firms 
to sue based on an estimate of success probability and potential gains of a class action. Therefore it 
is not inconceivable that the same unobserved factors that drive these decisions may also drive the 
interest of financial analysts in covering a specific firm. For example an untimely declaration of 
the CEO could spark the interest both of the SEC and of the community of financial analysts. 
In this section we adopt an identification strategy based on a difference-in-differences (DID) 
around exogenous reductions in analyst coverage due to mergers and closures of brokerage 
houses. Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) argue that when two brokerage houses merge, all the stocks 
firms that were previously covered by both houses will experience an exogenous drop of one in analyst 
coverage due to the fact that the new resulting entity will provide a single forecast for the firms. 
Similarly Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) argue that the closure of brokerage houses produces a similar 
exogenous shock for all the firms that were covered by the now disappeared entity. This identification 
strategy has been used by a number of authors. Literature has tied a drop in analysts coverage to 
changes in innovation policy (He and Tian, 2013), corporate investments (Derrien and Kecskés, 
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2013), corporate governance (Chen, Harford, and Lin, 2015) and the cost of debt (Derrien, Kecskés, 
and Mansi, 2016) among others. 
The application of this quasi-natural experiment to our setting is not straightforward due to the 
discrete (and sparse) nature of our outcome variable (litigation event). A possible workaround is 
to analyze the effect of the drop in coverage on the probability of being involved in litigation 
event (litigation risk) rather than counting the events themselves. We first estimate the litigation 
risk with a probit model similar to our base specification where the probability of a litigation event 
is modelled on firm characteristics and accounting-based proxy variables for managerial 
misbehavior. After obtaining the estimated litigation risk, we then analyze the change in litigation 
risk around the exogenous drop in coverage caused by the closure or merger of brokerage firms.3 
Due to the fact that it may take some time for fraud to be discovered, we consider both short-term- 
and long-term changes in litigation risk where short-term is defined as the change in litigation risk 
between the year following the broker closure/merger (T + 1) and the average of the three years 
prior to it (T − 3  to T − 1), and long-term is defined as the change in litigation risk between the three 
years after the closure/merger (T + 1 to T + 3) and the three years prior to it. 
Since other time-related factors could affect this change, we build a control sample by 
matching every firm that is affected by the closure/merger of a brokerage house with a firm with 
similar characteristics but unaffected by the event. We explore three different matching strategies. 
First of all we consider the closest neighbor, from the same industry, in terms of Mahalanobis 
distance based on all the firm characteristics described in Table I. As a second possibility we also 
consider the closest neighbor in terms of Mahalanobis distance based on firm characteristics and 
accounting-based proxies for managerial misbehavior.4 Finally we implement a third matching 
strategy based on a propensity score model estimated on firm characteristics and proxies for 
managerial misbehavior. In all matching strategies every observation in the treated sample is 
                                                        
3 We thank François Derrien and Jarrad Harford for sharing the list of brokerage disappearances with us. See Derrien 
and Kecskes (2013) and Chen, Harford, and Lin (2015) for a detailed description of the selection process. 
4 Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2011) show that nearest-neighbor matching estimators are not consistent when matching 
on two or more continuous covariates and propose a bias-corrected estimator that is consistent. Here we implement 
their suggestion and report the bias-corrected estimator. 
20  
matched with observations from the same period and the same industry (Fama and French 12). 
We also consider an alternative version of these matches where every treated observation is 
matched with the five closest neighbors. 
From Table V we see that firms affected by an exogenous drop in analyst coverage (treated) 
experience a significant drop in litigation risk compared to the control firms. The reduction is in 
the range of 0.09% to 0.20%. Considering that the average treated firm is covered by 16 analysts 
(with a standard deviation of 8), our results suggest that a drop in coverage of one standard 
deviation would lead to a decrease in litigation risk of 0.7% - 1.6%. This magnitude is remarkably 
similar to what we measured with our baseline model in Table III. 
 
7. Discipline or Pressure? 
 
We need to acknowledge that our interpretation of the empirical evidence so far may have been 
too optimistic. We argue that the increased litigation risk for firms covered by a larger number of 
analysts is due to the disciplining role of analysts. But what if it was, in fact, a result of increased 
managerial misbehavior due to the intense pressure to meet short-term goals? He and Tian (2013) 
show that firms covered by more analysts tend to invest less in innovation, and the authors attribute 
this to the pressure of having to meet short term expectations. Irani and Oesch (2016) show that 
while analysts increase accounting quality they also incentivize more aggressive forms of real 
earnings manipulation. 
Distinguishing between discipline and pressure hypotheses is intrinsically difficult as we cannot 
observe managerial misbehavior directly but only litigation events associated with it. The 
identification strategy that we suggest here is based on time- and cross-sectional variations in 
managerial entrenchment. Highly entrenched managers are less likely to feel the pressure to 
perform as they are less likely to be punished in the case of bad performance. An interesting and 
critical feature of this identification strategy is that discipline and pressure hypotheses lead to two 
opposite empirical predictions. If analysts’ activity lead to increased pressure we should observe a 
weaker effect of coverage on litigation risk for highly entrenched CEOs as these managers have no 
21  
pressure to manipulate earnings to outperform. On the other side if analysts’ activity leads to 
increased discipline we should observe a stronger effect of coverage on litigation risk for firms 
with entrenched managers, the reason being that in these firms the information on managerial 
misbehavior produced by analysts is particularly valuable to (small) shareholders who are more 
exposed to expropriation risk one as mechanisms of internal governance usually fails to discipline 
entrenched managers (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). In our 
identification strategy we model managerial entrenchment looking at governance quality (as proxied 
by the governance index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and at the presence of 
large institutional investors. 
 
7.1. Governance Index 
 
First we look at the Governance index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).5 This index 
ranks companies of the S&P 1500 on a scale from 1 to 24 based on the presence of different 
provisions that limit shareholder rights (increase managerial entrenchment). A high value of the index 
indicates high managerial entrenchment. The index is available only from 1990 to 2006, therefore 
we limit this part of our analysis to this sub-period. 
In order to distinguish between discipline and pressure we augment our base model with an 
interaction between (log) coverage and an indicator variable for firms-years characterized by higher 
managerial entrenchment (those with a value of the Governance index higher than the median value 
of 9). 
 
Pr(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) = Φ(α+ β𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜆𝜆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘)           (2) 
 
 
A positive interaction coefficient λ would indicate that the positive effect of coverage on 
                                                        
5 We thank the authors for making this data available. 
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litigation risk is stronger for firms with highly entrenched managers, supporting the disciplining 
hypothesis. A negative coefficient, on the other side, would indicate a lower effect for these firms 
and would thus support the pressure hypothesis. Table VI reports the results. The results indicate 
that analyst coverage have a stronger effect on firms with highly entrenched managers as shown by 
the positively significant interaction terms. Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of coverage on the 
probability of being involved in a litigation event for the two groups of firms using the estimated 
coefficients of model (3) in Table VI. We see that a high level of coverage increases the litigation 
risk for both groups of firms, but the effect is materially stronger in firms with higher managerial 
entrenchment, supporting our disciplining hypothesis. 
 
[Place Table VI about here] 
 
 




7.2. Institutional  Ownership 
 
The previous analysis is somewhat limited by the availability of the governance index. In order 
to provide a more general and robust result here we replicate our experiment considering that the 
absence of large institutional investors can also provide an alternative source of managerial 
entrenchment. Institutional investors have both incentives and the power to discipline management 
due the size of their investments (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Demiralp, D’Mello, Schlingemann, 
and Subramaniam, 2011; McCahery, Sautner, and Starks, 2016). Hence managers are less 
entrenched in firms with more institutional investors. We proxy the relevance of large institutional 
investors by looking at the share of stocks held by Institutional investors (according to the 13f 
filings) and the number of institutional shareholders of the company with holdings larger than 2%. 
For sake of comparability with the previous analysis we split firm/year observations in two groups 
and define “Entrenched” as observations with the share of institutional ownership (or number of 
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institutions with holdings larger than 2%) that is below the median value. 
As before we argue that if the effect of coverage on litigation risk is due to additional 
discipline, it should be stronger for firms with highly entrenched managers. Vice versa if the 
effect is due to the additional pressure to meet short term earnings goals, it should register 
stronger for firms where institutional investors expect managers to meet the short term earnings 
benchmarks. 
Results in Table VII confirm our previous findings. The interaction term between coverage and 
entrenched is positive, indicating that the activity of financial analysts has a stronger (positive) effect 
on litigation risk for firms with entrenched managers. The marginal plots in Figure 4 show that the 
effect is material. 
 
[Place Table VII about here] 
 
 





In this paper we investigate the role of financial analysts as corporate watchdogs. Prior 
research shows that firms covered by a larger number of analysts produce higher quality 
accounting information, and in this paper we show that this effect is due to an increased 
probability of being involved in litigation events such as SEC investigations or securities class 
actions. We show that after controlling for a number of firm characteristics and for observable 
signs of managerial misbehavior, a standard deviation increase in analyst coverage increase litigation 
risk by 30% - 53%. We also show that the effect is significantly stronger for brokers affiliated with 
institutional investors who own a stake in the covered company. 
Since analyst coverage decisions are not random our results could be an artifact of some 
unobservable factors. We address this issue by using a quasi-natural experiment based on 
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exogenous shocks to coverage due to mergers and closure of brokerage houses. Our main result 
is confirmed both in significance and size. 
We then address a possible alternative interpretation of our main empirical finding. Some authors 
have argued that analysts may exert pressure on the management to meet short term goals. If this is 
true the increase in litigation risk for firms covered by a larger number of analysts may be due to 
the additional incentive to misbehave, rather than by the additional disciplining. We address this 
issue by exploiting time-series and cross-sectional variations in managerial entrenchment. We argue 
that while the discipline hypothesis predicts stronger effect of coverage on litigation risk for firms 
with highly entrenched managers (as mechanisms of internal governance usually fails in these 
circumstances) the pressure hypothesis leads to the opposite prediction as highly entrenched 
managers cannot be easily punished for underperforming. 
Our empirical results confirm the discipline hypothesis: analyst coverage increases the 
probability of a firm to be involved in a litigation event, especially in firms with highly 
entrenched managers. At least in this case we find no evidence of the so-called “dark side” of 
analyst coverage. 
This result sheds light on an important aspect of financial analysts’ activity. While the 
previous literature has shown that analysts can provide incentives for a more virtuous behavior of 
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Table I: Variable Definitions 
This  table  contains  the  definition  of  all  the  variables  used  throughout  the  paper 
 
Firm Characteristics 
Coverage Number of analysts following a company at the beginning of the fiscal year (from 
IBES Summary File). Within regression frameworks we use the natural logarithm 
of Coverage indicated as Log(Coverage). 
Size Total Assets (Compustat AT).Within regression frameworks we use the natural 
logarithm of Size indicated as Log(Size). 
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets divided by book value of assets (AT). Market value of 
assets is calculated as Total Assets (AT) minus book value of common equity 
(CEQ) and deferred taxes (TXDB) plus market value of equity. Market value 
of equity is defined as the product of market price at the ending of the fiscal 
period (PRCC F) and the number of common shares outstanding (CSHO). 
Leverage Long-Term Debt (DLTT) plus Debt in Current Liabilities (DLC) divided by Total 
Assets (AT). 
PPE Property, Plant and Equipment (PPENT) divided by Total Assets (AT). 
ROA Operating Income Before Depreciation (OIBDP) divided by Total Assets (AT). 
CF Volatility Is the time series volatility of operating cash flows over the entire sample. 
Ext. Financing Is the sum of net equity and net debt issues. Net equity issue is defined as the 
change in book value of equity minus change in retained earnings (RE) divided by 
Total Assets (AT). Book value of equity is defined as total assets (AT) minus total 
liabilities (LT) and preferred stocks (PSTKL) plus deferred taxes and investment 
tax credit (TXDITC) and convertible debt (DCVT).  When the value for preferred 
stocks is missing it is replaced with the redemption value of preferred stocks 
(PSTKRV). Net debt issue is defined as change in total assets minus change in 
book value of equity divided by total assets (AT). 
Managerial Misbehavior 
Abn. Accruals Absolute value of abnormal discretionary accruals (See Appendix for the 
calculation). 
Abn. Cash Flows Is the abnormal value of cash flows (See Appendix for the calculation). 
Abn. Production Is the abnormal value of production costs (See Appendix for the calculation). 
Abn. Expenses Is the abnormal value of discretionary expenses (See Appendix for the calculation). 
Governance Quality 
G-Index Governance quality index from Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). 
Institutional Percentage of common shares owned by institutional investors (from 13f Filings). 
Own 2% Number of institutional investors with equity holding above 2% (from 13f Filings). 
 
Table I: Variable Definitions 
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Table II: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports mean and standard deviation for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Descriptive 
statistics are calculated for three subsamples. Firm/Year observations not involved in any litigation event 
(1988 - 2016), observations where an AAER event occurred (1988 - 2013) and observations where a security 
class action occurred (1996 - 2016). T tests are calculated for the significance of the difference of the mean 
values for firms involved in litigation events and firms not involved in litigation events. T-Statistics are 
displayed in parentheses. (***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
 
  Not Involved   AAER   Securities Class Action 
Num. Obs. 59,032  588  994 
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 





























































Abn. Expenses -0.022 0.1861  -0.053*** 0.227  -0.016 0.208 




Table III: Analysts Coverage and Litigation Risk 
This table reports probit estimations where the dichotomous dependent variable is a litigation event. Models 
1 - 2 use data from 1988 to 2013 and consider AAER as litigation events. Models 3 – 4 use data from 1996 
to 2016 and consider Shareholders Class Actions as litigation events. Models 5 - 6 consider both forms of 
litigation and use data from 1988 to 2016. All the independent variables are described in Table I. All models 
include time and industry fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-Statistics are 
displayed in parentheses. (***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively).  
 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
  AAER  Securities Class Action  Litigation Event 
Log (Coverage) 0.104** 0.120***  0.219*** 0.203***  0.181*** 0.175*** 
 (2.555) (2.919)  (9.322) (8.708)  (7.863) (7.671) 
Log (Size) 0.094*** 0.089***  0.066*** 0.083***  0.081*** 0.090*** 
 (4.427) (4.046)  (5.399) (6.778)  (6.689) (7.341) 
Tobin's Q 0.022 0.043**  -0.021 -0.032**  0.003 0.005 
 (1.080) (2.169)  (-1.515) (-2.192)  (0.240) (0.355) 
Leverage 0.206 0.129  -0.008 -0.030  0.058 0.020 
 (1.245) (0.759)  (-0.088) (-0.316)  (0.620) (0.204) 
PPE -0.898*** -0.884***  -0.225** -0.202*  -0.471*** -0.464*** 
 (-3.382) (-3.320)  (-2.124) (-1.858)  (-3.874) (-3.787) 
ROA -0.476* -0.238  -1.212*** -0.971***  -1.058*** -0.849*** 
 (-1.877) (-0.814)  (-10.117) (-6.991)  (-8.736) (-5.854) 
CF Volatility 0.009 0.011  0.024* 0.021  0.025* 0.022* 
 (0.273) (0.410)  (1.698) (1.565)  (1.795) (1.648) 
Ext. Financing 0.587*** 0.680***  -0.108 -0.241***  0.206*** 0.142* 
 (5.537) (6.018)  (-1.219) (-2.789)  (2.715) (1.867) 
Inst. Ownership 0.517*** 0.504***  -0.002 0.035  0.189*** 0.215*** 
 (3.644) (3.549)  (-0.038) (0.581)  (2.806) (3.189) 
Abn. Accruals  -0.307   1.268***   0.846*** 
  (-1.014)   (7.834)   (5.133) 
Abn. Cash Flows  -0.930***   -0.479**   -0.627*** 
  (-3.287)   (-2.571)   (-3.611) 
Abn. Production  -0.158   -0.240*   -0.254** 
  (-0.847)   (-1.893)   (-2.088) 
Abn. Expenses  -0.359*   0.041   -0.180 
  (-1.810)   (0.363)   (-1.528) 
Constant -5.063*** -5.087***  -3.154*** -3.402***  -2.719*** -2.887*** 
 (-11.015) (-10.931)  (-17.712) (-18.596)  (-17.211) (-17.818) 
Year and Industry FE Y Y   Y Y   Y Y 
Clustered SE Y Y  Y Y  Y Y 
N 48,829 48,829  48,469 48,469  59,313 59,313 




Table IV: Affiliated vs unaffiliated coverage 
This table reports probit estimations where the dichotomous dependent variable is a litigation event (AAER 
or Shareholder Class Action). Our main variables of interest are the (natural log of) affiliated and unaffiliated 
coverage. Coverage is “affiliated” if the broker is affiliated with an institutional investor with ownership in 
the covered company. Models (4) to (6) repeat the analysis on the sub-sample of companies where the 
affiliated coverage is non-zero. All independent variables are described in Table I. All models include time 
and industry fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-Statistics are displayed in 
parentheses. (***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively). 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
  Entire Sample  Firms with Affiliated Coverage > 0 
Log (Affiliated Cov.) 0.259*** 0.196*** 0.190***  0.387*** 0.326*** 0.319*** 
 (9.598) (6.648) (6.444)  (9.572) (7.581) (7.438) 
Log (Non Affil. Cov.) 0.151*** 0.121*** 0.117***  0.096*** 0.080*** 0.075*** 
 (6.640) (4.855) (4.727)  (3.670) (2.839) (2.677) 
Log (Size)  0.063*** 0.072***   0.064*** 0.073*** 
  (4.862) (5.545)   (3.915) (4.481) 
Tobin's Q  -0.005 -0.003   -0.007 -0.006 
  (-0.331) (-0.182)   (-0.421) (-0.369) 
Leverage  0.063 0.025   0.112 0.072 
  (0.674) (0.262)   (0.969) (0.609) 
PPE  -0.474*** -0.465***   -0.684*** -0.679*** 
  (-3.881) (-3.781)   (-4.969) (-4.887) 
ROA  -1.049*** -0.838***   -1.007*** -0.898*** 
  (-8.704) (-5.807)   (-6.555) (-4.605) 
CF Volatility  0.022 0.020   0.394*** 0.368*** 
  (1.622) (1.474)   (2.719) (2.667) 
Ext. Financing  0.192** 0.129*   0.150 0.112 
  (2.546) (1.703)   (1.627) (1.186) 
Inst. Ownership  0.160** 0.186***   0.099 0.134 
  (2.289) (2.664)   (1.122) (1.528) 
Abn. Accruals   0.809***    0.693*** 
   (4.927)    (3.239) 
Abn. Cash Flows   -0.632***    -0.646*** 
   (-3.625)    (-2.772) 
Abn. Production   -0.247**    -0.395** 
   (-2.033)    (-2.401) 
Abn. Expenses   -0.170    -0.247 
   (-1.438)    (-1.571) 
Constant -2.338*** -2.548*** -2.717***  -3.218*** -3.122*** -3.265*** 
 (-21.872) (-15.666) (-16.334)  (-15.695) (-12.448) (-12.833) 
Year and Industry FE Y Y Y   Y Y Y 
Clustered SE Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
N 59,313 59,313 59,313  28,228 28,228 28,228 




Table V: Difference-in-Differences Estimation 
The table reports the results of a diff-in-diff estimation of litigation risk changes around an exogenous drop in analyst coverage due to a merger 
between two brokerage houses or the closure of a brokerage house. Litigation risk is defined as the probability of being involved in a litigation event 
estimated with a probit model of our litigation events over firm and characteristics and managerial misbehavior proxies detailed in Table I. We 
consider short-term (Panel A) and long-term (Panel B) change of litigation risk. Short term is defined as the change between the year following the 
broker closure/merger (T + 1) and the average of the three years before (T − 3 to T − 1). Long term is defined as the change between the three years 
after the closure/merger (T + 1 to T + 3) and the three years before. Every treated firm is matched with either one or five control firms from the same 
period and the same industry (Fama-French 12) based on one of three different matching criteria: a) closest neighbor(s) in terms of Malhanobis 
distance on firm characteristics; b) closest neighbor(s) in terms of Malhanobis distance on firm characteristics and misbehavior proxies; c) closest 
neighbor(s) in terms of propensity score estimated on firm characteristics and misbehavior proxies. For every matching strategy we report the average 
change in litigation risk for treatment and control sample as well as for the difference between the two, our diff-in-diff estimator. T-Statistics are 
displayed in parentheses. (***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively).  
 
Panel A: Short Term Effect 
  N. of Obs. Treatment Control Diff-in-Diff t-stat 
Closest Neighbor           
Matched by firm characteristics 1740 0.431 0.611 -0.180 (-2.868)*** 
Matched by firm and accounting characteristics 1740 0.431 0.567 -0.136 (-2.188)** 
Propensity Score Matching 1740 0.431 0.626 -0.195 (-2.948)*** 
Closest ten Neighbors          
Matched by firm characteristics 1740 0.431 0.586 -0.154 (-2.985)*** 
Matched by firm and accounting characteristics 1740 0.431 0.542 -0.111 (-2.137)** 
Propensity Score Matching 1740 0.431 0.660 -0.229 (-4.154)*** 
Panel B: Long Term Effect 
Closest Neighbor           
Matched by firm characteristics 1524 0.275 0.464 -0.188 (-3.211)*** 
Matched by firm and accounting characteristics 1524 0.275 0.405 -0.130 (-2.237)** 
Propensity Score Matching 1524 0.275 0.390 -0.114 (-1.903)* 
Closest ten Neighbors          
Matched by firm characteristics 1524 0.275 0.421 -0.146 (-2.996)*** 
Matched by firm and accounting characteristics 1524 0.275 0.367 -0.092 (-1.878)* 




Table VI: Governance Index 
The table shows the results of a probit estimation of the effect of analyst coverage on the probability of 
litigation for firms with different levels of managerial entrenchment (governance quality). Entrenched is 
defined as a Gompers et al. (2003) governance index above 9 (the median value in our sample). The analysis 
is repeated for the entire period (Models 1 - 3) and for the sub-period prior to the changes in governance 
data reporting introduced by IRRC in 2007 (Models 4 - 6). All the independent variables are described in 
Table I. All models include time and industry fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
T-Statistics are displayed in parentheses. (***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively). 
  
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Entire Period  Before 2007 
Log (Coverage) 0.248*** 0.117*** 0.113***  0.244*** 0.119** 0.120** 
 (6.555) (2.911) (2.811)  (5.204) (2.377) (2.406) 








 (-1.984) (-2.277) (-2.248)  (-3.367) (-3.634) (-3.656) 
Log (Coverage) x Entrenched 0.104* 0.121** 0.120**  0.237*** 0.251*** 0.254*** 
  (1.712) (2.099) (2.081)   (3.218) (3.512) (3.526) 
Firm Controls N Y Y  N Y Y 
Misbehavior Controls N N Y  N N Y 
Year FE Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Clustered SE Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
N 27,411 27,411 27,411  17,055 17,055 17,055 




Table VII: Institutional Ownership 
The table shows the results of a probit estimation of the effect of analyst coverage on the probability of 
litigation for firms with different levels of managerial entrenchment (institutional ownership). Firm/year 
observations are labeled Entrenched either if the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors 
(Models 1 - 3) or the number of institutional investors with holding greater than 2% (Models 4 - 6) are below 
the median value. All the independent variables are described in Table I. All models include time and 
industry fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-Statistics are displayed in 
parentheses. (***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively). 
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 % of Institutional Ownership  N. of Inst. Investors with holding >2% 
Log (Coverage) 0.208*** 0.130*** 0.127***  0.205*** 0.136*** 0.133*** 
 (7.571) (4.454) (4.382)  (8.164) (5.055) (4.965) 
Entrenched -0.235*** -0.309*** -0.317***  -0.252*** -0.316*** -0.326*** 
 (-2.950) (-3.933) (-4.034)  (-3.262) (-4.159) (-4.293) 
Log (Coverage) x 
Entrenched 0.115*** 0.134*** 0.132***  
0.124*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 
 (3.245) (3.883) (3.822)  (3.612) (3.940) (3.933) 
Firm Controls N Y Y   N Y Y 
Misbehavior Controls N N Y   N N Y 
Year FE Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Clustered SE Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
N 59,313 59,313 59,313  59,313 59,313 59,313 




Figure 1: Analyst coverage and litigation risk 
The figure shows the estimated litigation risk (probability of being involved in a litigation event) for levels 
of (log-) coverage ranging from the 5th to the 95th percentile. Estimations are based on the coefficients of 
models (2) and (4) in Table III. For ease of interpretation graph is re-scaled on number of analysts (rather 
than the logarithm). The plot also reports the 95% confidence intervals for the marginal effects. The 
unconditional litigation risk is 0.97% for AAERs and 1.64% for Securities class actions. Coverage has mean 
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Figure 2: Affiliated coverage and litigation risk 
The figure shows the estimated litigation risk (probability of being involved in a litigation event) for the 
first ten affiliated and unaffiliated analysts covering a firm. Estimations are based on the coefficients of 
model (6) in Table IV. For ease of interpretation graph is re- scaled on number of analysts (rather than the 
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Figure 3: Governance Index 
The figure shows the estimated litigation risk (probability of being involved in a litigation event) for levels 
of (log-) coverage ranging from the 5th to the 95th percentile. Estimations are based on the coefficients of 
model (2) and in Table 6 and are reported separately for firms with high and low levels of managerial 
entrenchment based on the GIM index. For ease of interpretation graph is re-scaled on number of analysts 
(rather than the logarithm). The plot also reports the 95% confidence intervals for the marginal effects. The 


































































































Figure 4: Institutional Ownership 
The figure shows the estimated litigation risk (probability of being involved in a litigation event) for levels 
of (log-) coverage ranging from the 5th to the 95th percentile. Estimations are based on the coefficients of 
models (3) and (6) in Table VII and are reported separately for firms with high and low levels of managerial 
entrenchment. High managerial entrenchment is defined as share of institutional ownership (or number of 
institutions with holdings larger than 2%) below the median value. For ease of interpretation graph is re-
scaled on number of analysts (rather than the logarithm). The plot also reports the 95% confidence intervals 
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Appendix A. Estimation of discretionary accruals 
 
Following Yu (2008) we use a modified version of the Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney, 1995), which estimates discretionary accruals from regressions of total accruals on 
changes in sales and on property, plant, and equipment within industries. To determine discretionary 
accruals, we run the following cross-sectional OLS regression by the first two-digit of the standard 













+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖         (A1) 
         
where i indexes firms, t indexes time, TAi,t is total accruals defined as Net Income (Compustat 
item NI) minus Cash Flow from Operations (item OANCF), ∆REVi,t is the change in sales 
revenues (item SALE), and PPEi,t is gross property, plant, and equipment (item PPEGT). All the 
variables used here are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period (item AT). We estimate 
the cross sectional models separately for each combination of calendar year and two-digit SIC 
code with a minimum of 15 observations. We then use the estimated coefficients β̂  1, β̂ 2  and β̂  3  to 
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− 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                         (A3) 
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Appendix B. Real Earnings Manipulation 
 
We follow a similar approach to develop empirical measures for real activities manipulation. 
Following, among others, Roychowdhury (2006), Zang (2012) and Irani and Oesch (2016) we use 
industry- and year-specific cross-sectional regressions to estimate the expected values of cash flows, 
production costs and discretionary expenses and use the estimated coefficient to build firm-year 
specific measures of real earnings manipulation based on the ”abnormal” values of these quantities. 
 
Abnormal Cash Flows 
 
We express normal CFO as a linear function of sales and change in sales. We estimate this model 













+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖         (B1) 
 
For each firm-year abnormal cash flow is defined as the actual level of actual cash flows minus 
the expected level of cash flows calculated using the estimated coefficients from this model. 
CFOi,t is cash flow from operations in period (item OANCF minus item XIDOC). 
 
Abnormal Production Costs 
 
Again we first estimate the expected level of production costs for firms in certain year and 
















+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖       (B2) 
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Where PRODi,t is production costs defined as the sum of Cost of Goods Sold (item COGS) 
and the change in inventories (item INVT). The abnormal production costs for each firm-year are 
computed as the difference between the actual values and the expected levels predicted from this 
equation. 
 
Abnormal Discretionary Expenses 
 
We model discretionary expenses as a function of lagged sales and estimate the following model 










+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖         (B3) 
 
Where DISXi,t represents the discretionary expenditures defined as the sum of advertising 
expenses (item XAD), R&D expenses (item XRD), and Selling, General and Administrative 
Expenses (item XSGA). Abnormal discretionary expenses are computed as the difference 
between the actual values and the expected levels predicted from this equation. 
